important implications for our understanding of the Court's ability to make public policy and the central constitutional concepts of judicial independence, the separation of powers and checks and balances. The results of various studies, however, appear to conflict with one another. Adherents of the attitudinal model (AM) offer empirical evidence that judicial voting is unaffected by the preferences of Congress (Segal, 1997; Segal & Spaeth, 2002; Segal & Wang, 2001) , whereas proponents of "rational choice models" (Segal & Spaeth, 2002) claim that justices' votes are in fact influenced by congressional preferences (Bergara et al., 2003; Epstein & Knight, 1998; Spiller & Gely, 1992) . 2 In this article, I examine and empirically test a central assumption of strategic models of Supreme Court voting. Specifically, I consider whether the Court selects legal instruments used in the majority opinions of federal statutory cases to reduce the likelihood that Congress will overturn that opinion. By legal instruments, sometimes referred to as legal grounds, I mean the type or types of legal analysis, interpretation, language, and explanation that the Court's decision is premised on in the corresponding majority opinion (Smith & Tiller, 2002) . 3 The choice of legal instruments is vital because it establishes the legal rules which lower courts will apply to other political institutions and private actors and defines the legal and constitutional hurdles that Congress must clear should it desire to overturn or modify a Court decision (Smith & Tiller, 2002, pp. 62-63) . I contend that when the Court anticipates adverse congressional reaction to its decision, that the Court strategically selects constitutional decision grounds over statutory decision grounds to make it extremely difficult for Congress to overturn that decision. To test this proposition, I examine instrument choice in cases involving federal statutes using decisions from the 1953 to 2000 Court terms. I find evidence that the Court selects constitutional decision grounds when its preferences diverge from those of Congress in federal statutory opinions. These results provide evidence that the Court is more likely to use constitutional grounds in its opinion as its preferences increasingly diverge from those of Congress and suggest that a critical assumption of rational choice models of judicial voting is incorrect.
Theories of Judicial Decision Making and the Choice of Legal Instruments
cast votes based on their personal policy preferences in light of the facts in a case. Of particular importance in this update is the authors' defense of the AM against criticisms from what they term rational choice models of judicial decision making. These rational choice models hypothesize that justices are not free to cast completely ideologically based votes but rather must consider the preferences and likely choices of other political actors. Much of Segal and Spaeth's critique focuses on a subset of rational choices models called separation-of-powers (SOP) models. SOP models typically concentrate on Congress and whether the threat of Congress overturning Court decisions through legislation affects the voting behavior of justices. Consistent with the AM, SOP models expect that justices will be influenced by their ideological preferences. SOP models depart from the AM, however, by contending that the influence of judicial preferences will be mitigated by the preferences of Congress, so that justices will select a policy outcome that is closest to their preferred outcomes that simultaneously will not be deemed undesirable by Congress and thus overturned (Segal & Spaeth, 2002, p. 105) .
One of the key elements of Segal and Spaeth's (2002, pp. 106-110) review of SOP models is a critical discussion of a set of assumptions about how the Court and Congress operate. The authors believe that several of these assumptions are overly broad or erroneous and lead SOP models to overstate how strategic justices have to be and understate how attitudinal justices can be when voting. One of the key SOP assumptions that Segal and Spaeth question is that the Court cannot manipulate the mode of interpretation, what I called legal instruments in the previous section, used in the majority opinion:
Nearly unanimous are the separation-of-powers modelers in their decisions to treat the levels of interpretation as exogenously determined. Nevertheless, in many cases the Court can opt out of statutory mode and find constitutional bases for its decisions. (p. 106) 4 By changing the mode of interpretation to constitutional, the Court can virtually remove the ability of Congress to react because decisions which employ constitutional interpretation are more difficult for Congress to overturn than those which only use statutory interpretation. If the Court reaches a decision regarding the interpretation of a congressional statute that Congress does not like, Congress might remove the Court's jurisdiction to review such cases (Epstein & Walker, 2004, pp. 96-97) or pass new legislation that meets the Court's legal requirements but changes the policy impact of the Court's decision (Eskridge, 1991; Segal, 1997; Spiller & Gely, 1992) . 5 If the Court reaches a decision that relies on constitutional interpretation that Congress finds unpalatable, Congress can only change the policy by initiating a constitutional amendment. 6 Segal and Spaeth argue that SOP models understate the power that the Court has to shield itself from congressional reactions by assuming that the model of interpretation is exogenously determined. If justices carefully select the legal instruments to avoid congressional responses, then SOP models incorrectly assume that the justices must strategically consider the preferences of Congress when voting on the merits.
Somewhat remarkable about Segal and Spaeth's argument is that it essentially criticizes SOP models for not being strategic enough. The argument that Segal and Spaeth make whereby the Court moves to constitutional mode is clearly a strategic account. The Court acts strategically if it chooses to change its behavior based on anticipation of Congress's behavior. Segal and Spaeth remain true to the AM, however, because the central argument of the AM is that judicial voting is purely attitudinal, not all forms of judicial behavior. Moreover, Segal and Spaeth can credibly make such an argument because the AM model maintains that to the justices themselves, legal explanations are only matters of "policy preference and analytic convenience" (Smith & Tiller, 2002, pp. 62) . Thus, Segal and Spaeth suggest that the SOP model of judicial voting is too simplistic because it fails to consider other strategic, nonvoting choices available to the Court.
This point is even more surprising given that some rational choice scholarship on the law has considered instrument choice. Segal and Spaeth's argument is very similar to a broad theoretical perspective called strategic instrument theory (SIT).
7 SIT holds that political actors who are concerned that a political principal will change the actor's policy choice will strategically select the legal instruments of their written decisions to reduce the likelihood that a reviewing principal will overturn that decision (Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007; Smith & Tiller, 2002; Spiller & Spitzer, 1992; Tiller & Spiller, 1999) . According to Smith and Tiller (2002) , SIT focuses on the power of lower-level actors to affect the ability of higherlevel actors to reverse the lower-level actors' policy decisions. (pp. 63-64) The power that these lower-level actors have is the selection of the legal premises of their opinions that could be reviewed by the higher level actors. In their initial elaboration of SIT, Spiller and Spitzer (1992) considered theoretically how actors (federal agencies and lower courts) whose decisions were reviewable by a principal (higher courts or a legislature) have incentives to increase the costs of review for their principals to reduce the likelihood of review and attempts by the principal to change the policy. Their formal models indicate that increasing the cost of review of overturning a decision through selection of the legal instruments will better protect the underlying policy choice that the opinion makes. Spiller and Spitzer's model is extremely useful as it is flexible enough to be applied to different levels of the judiciary as well as administrative agencies whose decisions can be reviewed by courts.
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Several authors have applied this theory in both formal and empirical studies. Tiller and Spiller (1999) rely on SIT to develop a strategic account of institutional behavior in which agencies and courts each manipulate the instruments of decision grounds to insulate their policy choices from being undone by a principal. By formal means, the authors show that agencies and lower courts are more likely to use instruments with "higher decision costs" when it is more likely that the reviewing court will overturn their decisions. In particular, they show that judges have incentives to use constitutional instruments rather than statutory instruments when a court is trying to avoid congressional overrides.
Subsequent research has found empirical evidence that members of the federal judiciary strategically select decision grounds. Smith and Tiller (2002) extend SIT to the context of administrative law at the federal circuit courts of appeals level. They focus on the strategic selection of legal instruments, concluding that judges use instrument choice to shield their opinions from being reversed by a higher court that is ideologically dissimilar. 9 Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) apply SIT to federal criminal sentencing decisions in relation to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Their empirical results reveal that district court judges who wish to defect from the Guidelines strategically select legal instruments when they fear adverse reactions from the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. According to the authors, trial judges are more likely to select factual as opposed to legal reasoning in their decisions when faced with circuit court constraint because the sentencing guidelines are vaguer about deviations for factual reasons than for legal reasons. This difference makes it less likely that reviewing circuit court would overturn sentences deviations for factual reasons.
The expectations of SIT and Segal and Spaeth that judges will manipulate the legal instruments of their decisions for political reasons fly in the face of much traditional legal scholarship. Legal-based explanations of judicial decision making focus on how the law, legal doctrine, and legal principles influence the pronouncements that judges make. Judges are thought to be concerned with the creation of neutral principles and the development of consistent law (Carter, 1988; Epstein & Knight, 1998, pp. 40-45; Segal & Spaeth, 1993; Segal & Spaeth, 2002, chap. 2) . According to the legal model (LM), these legal considerations carry over to the writing of legal opinions as well (Epstein & Knight, 1998) . Judges select the legal grounds of their opinions to explain how they reached their decisions. They use the legal grounds to analyze the important legal issues, case law, and facts contained in a given case to reach legal outcomes (Smith & Tiller, 2002, p. 62) . The choice of legal instruments in the majority opinion represents the method or methods by which the Court determines the disposition of the case, not an attempt to tie the hands of Congress.
Although it is up to justices to determine which legal instruments to employ in a decision, strong judicial norms discourage against invoking constitutional review if the case can be resolved in another way. According to Lamb (1982, p. 14) , there are a number of "maxims of judicial restraint" that serve as self-imposed limitations on judges when deciding cases. Among others, he notes that judges will try to avoid reaching constitutional questions whenever possible. Lamb cites Justice Brandeis's well known concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) as a source of several of these norms. Of particular importance to this article is the following excerpt:
The Court will not pass on a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground on which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.
10
Justice Brandeis argues that judges should not invoke constitutional review unless it is the only means by which to decide the case. Such restraint keeps judicial interference in the legislative process to a minimum because by resisting the temptation to engage in constitutional review, a court is likely to strike down fewer legislative acts. In addition, invoking constitutional review strongly insulates an opinion and the policy established by that opinion from alteration by the legislative branch because Congress cannot easily change the meaning of the constitution to undo the decision. By comparison, a Court decision based on statutory grounds could be more easily changed by Congress by amending the statute or passing a new statute. The Ashwander rules encourage judges to use constitutional review as a last resort so that courts do not limit the legislative power of Congress. The LM would expect that legal instruments are chosen solely to assist in the creation of legally sound opinions. Some scholars have even suggested that expecting the Supreme Court to strategically select between statutory and constitutional interpretation is "naïve[te]" because "most statutory interpretation cases do not present constitutional issues" (Tiller & Cross, 2006, p. 521) . Although there may be theoretical evidence to support such critiques, it is only through empirical verification that we can test whether this form of strategic behavior is more satisfying.
To summarize this section, we can clearly see that there are competing theories of instrument choice. Proponents of the AM claim that instrument choice is a viable means through which justices can vote in purely attitudinal manners and avoid the influence of congressional preferences. At the same time, both the LM and rational choice models of Supreme Court voting indirectly suggest that this option of instrument choice is not available to the Court. The LM argues that concern for the law and legal principles are the sole determinants of instrument choice. And as constituted in the existing literature, rational choice models of Court voting assume that mode of instruments are not chosen but instead are exogenously fixed. These different theoretical perspective and contrary expectations present an opportunity to test this assumption and perhaps indirectly indicate how free justices are to vote in an attitudinal manner.
Data and Method 11
To assess whether the Court alters the decision grounds of its opinion in anticipation of congressional responses, I model the Court's choice of legal instruments in the majority opinions in all cases involving a federal statute that resulted in a full opinion beginning with the 1953 term and ending with the 2000 term.
12 Using the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database (Spaeth, 1999) , I first selected all Supreme Court cases that were formally decided by a written opinion, including both orally argued cases with full decisions and per curiam decisions.
13 Second, I selected only cases that involve federal statutes because these cases present the most clear-cut interaction between Congress and the Court because of the means that Congress has available to respond to decisions it does not like and are the only cases that would provide the Court with the opportunity to either select statutory or constitutional interpretation.
It is also necessary to discuss an article closely related to this one, authored by Epstein, Segal, and Victor (2002) . Theoretically, they agree that constitutional decisions represent more difficult decisions for Congress to overturn. They assume, however, that the legal instruments within a case are fixed before the Court even accepts the case through the certiorari process. They theorize that the Court engages in "dynamic agenda setting" whereby it strategically selects a higher proportion of constitutional cases over statutory cases when the Court anticipates greater differences between its preferences and those of Congress.
14 Their data differentiate between statutory and constitutional cases based on the "primary authority for the Court's decision" (p. 416). This fact is important for two reasons. First, they use the word primary because their data come from Spaeth's (1999) United States Supreme Court Judicial Database. Although their dependent variable focuses on the primary authority for the decision, Spaeth actually includes data for the entire authority used in the opinion. This means that the authors ignore other issues in a case, even if those issues are a different type of legal instrument. Second, the authors make a strong assumption that legal grounds are unchangeable by the Supreme Court, which of course is the assumption that this article tests the validity of.
For this article, the dependent variable, legal instrument, represents the Court's selection of the legal grounds for its opinion. It represents the choice the Court makes between limiting or not limiting the ability of Congress to override its decision. The measure employs a discrete two-category coding scheme by separating statutory interpretation (coded 0) from a mix of federal statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation or just constitutional interpretation (coded 1). Because any use of constitutional legal grounds will limit the ability of Congress to overturn that decision, these two types were collapsed into one category. 15 As can be seen in Table 1 , the majority opinion only employed constitutional interpretation in approximately 12% of the cases in the data set. This suggests that the Court seldom escalates its review to a constitutional level. Moreover, this presents a critical test for the theoretical model posited above because there are so few observations of 1 that can be explained. Thus, a statistical finding that congressional preferences do increase the probability of observing a constitutional decision would be even more convincing.
The key variable of interest in this project is measuring the Court's anticipation of Congress choosing to overturn its policy choice, which is labeled congressional constraint. Measuring this concept is difficult because it requires gauging the Court's best guess about Congress's preferences relative to its own preferences. The most common approach is to create a distance measure between Court preferences and Congress's preferences. This distance represents the magnitude of differences between the two institutions over liberal-conservative policy matters. In the context of this article, this divergence represents the degree to which the Court should worry about adverse congressional responses. The assumption is that as the distance between the Court and Congress increases, Congress is more likely to attempt to override the Court's decision. Theoretically then, we would expect that as the distance increases, a forward thinking Court should be more likely to rely on constitutional legal grounds. Because greater distance between the institutions means that Congress is more likely to respond, the Court has greater need to protect its opinion with more constraining legal instruments.
There has been considerable debate about how exactly to measure this distance in the literature. The two major issues of contention are (a) how to place the Court and Congress on the same scale so that a valid measure of preference divergence can be gathered and (b) how to identify the meaningful and pivotal members of Congress who affect the lawmaking process, often referred to as the pivotal players. The first issue has been resolved by Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland (in press ). These authors developed ideology measures for individual justices on the Court that are on the same metric as Poole's (2005) common space scores for members of Congress and the president. I rely on their data and Poole's data to measure the preferences of individual members of Congress and the Court.
The second contentious issue, identifying the key congressional actors, has been addressed through the creation of congressional pivot models (Krehbiel, 1999) . These pivot models emphasize the identification of important members in the legislative process of both chambers of Congress. The simplest of models examine the range between the median members of each chamber whereas more complicated models examine the relevant filibuster, veto override, leadership, and committee and subcommittee chairmanship pivots. The important point is that all of these approaches focus King / Legal Instruments and the U.S. Supreme Court 629 on creating a measure that accurately captures the pivotal players to the lawmaking process. The pivots identified by any of these models are those that control whether or not legislation will be passed. In essence, they represent lawmaking Pareto sets, which, when considered in relation to the status quo, suggest whether Congress is likely or unlikely to be able to pass legislation that moves the policy position or leaves it alone. Segal (1997) tests several different pivot models of congressional preferences such as committee gatekeeping, multiple veto, and party caucus models to account for how important institutional features of each chamber of Congress might affect the lawmaking process. Bergara et al. (2003) believe that these models include far too many relevant actors so that the values of the Pareto sets often range less than 0 or 100, which means that the sets go beyond reasonable values for the scale used in Segal's study. 16 They suggest this is why Segal finds very few instances of potential congressional Constraint before estimating his statistical models. They advocate more simply constructed Pareto sets to include relevant and meaningful constraints and pivots. In particular Bergara, et al. employ a legislative constraint model adopted from Krehbiel's (1999) filibuster-veto model. According to Krehbiel, the key legislative hurdles for the House and Senate are the chambers' abilities to override a presidential veto, and for the Senate, its ability to invoke cloture and force a vote on a bill. Assuming both houses can overcome these two hurdles, they should be able to pass any legislation that lies between the relevant pivots. Bergara, Richman, and Spiller (1999, p. 18 ) originally created a cut point model based on Krehbiel's filibuster-veto model, labeled Figure 7 in their article, which I reproduce as Figure 1 . Under a Democratic president, the important legislators are the 40th most conservative Senator, the filibuster pivot, and the 67th most conservative Senator and the 290th most conservative House Member, the override pivots. Under a Republican president, these pivots move, so that the 33rd most conservative Senate Member and the 145th most conservative House Member are the override pivots and the 60th most conservative Senate member is the filibuster pivot.
In reviewing this table, Bergara, et al. made several errors. First, they misidentify the Filibuster Pivot under a Democratic president. To invoke cloture with a Democratic president, the 60th most liberal Senator must vote yes. The 60th most liberal Senator is not the 40th most conservative Senator but rather is the 41st most conservative Senator. They make the same counting error for the Senate Veto Pivot under a Republican president. To get the necessary votes to override a Republican presidential veto, two thirds of the Senate vote is necessary. This would require the 67th most liberal (34th most conservative) Senator, not the 33rd most conservative Senator. Even after these corrections are made, their model only holds for Congresses after 1975. This is true for two reasons. First, prior to the 94th Congress, the Senate had a higher threshold to invoke cloture, requiring a two-thirds majority rather than a three-fifths majority. 17 And second, during the 82nd through 85th Congresses, there were only 48 states, meaning the Senate only had 96 members, again changing which Senators numerically were the important veto and filibuster pivots. I correct these pivots and identify the correct legislators in Figures 2 to 4 . To provide values for these points, I use Poole's Common Space scores for each Congress to establish the Pareto sets.
Based on all of this, I used the Epstein et al. (in press) judicial preference measures and the three important pivots from the Filibuster-Veto Pareto sets to construct the congressional constraint variable. Similar to Segal (1997) , I calculated the absolute value of the distance between the three pivots and the Court and then selected the smallest as the measure of constraint. For signed opinions, I used the preference score for the justice who wrote the majority opinion. For unsigned opinions, I used the median King / Legal Instruments and the U.S. Supreme Court 631
Figure 1 Congress Pareto Sets for Democratic and Republican Presidents
For a Democratic President:
For a Republican President: For a Republican President:
Figure 3 Corrected Pivots for 86th-93rd Congresses
For a Republican President:
decides what legal grounds will be used in the majority opinion. Although she must negotiate and accommodate fellow coalition members (Maltzman, Spriggs, & Wahlbeck, 2000) , the opinion writer ultimately chooses which language will be included in the decision and thus the opinion will largely reflect her preferences. A recent study by Bonneau, Hammond, Maltzman, and Wahlbeck (2005) finds evidence that the policy preferences of the majority opinion writer are the crucial factors in determining the content and the policy set by the majority opinion. These results lend support to using a measure based on distance between the opinion writer and the relevant congressional pivots. This approach will provide a more dynamic measure of Court-Congress differences within the same year. Because the median Court justice tends to end up in majority coalitions, using the preference score of the median justice in the coalition will produce little variation, probably only between a more liberal and a more conservative score, within a given year. Thus, using the median justice would result in opinion scores that are fairly constant and because the congressional pivots remain constant within a given year, the resulting constraint measure would have limited variance.
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For these two reasons, I calculated the difference between the preference estimate of the opinion writer and closest of the three pivots. For unsigned opinions, the score for median justice from the majority coalition was used in place of the opinion writer because we cannot determine who wrote it. Congressional constraint could theoretically vary from 0 to 1, however, as King / Legal Instruments and the U.S. Supreme Court 633
Figure 4 Corrected Pivots for 82nd-85th Congresses
the descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate, the range for the years under consideration here is much smaller. This distance represents how far the opinion is from the lawmaking majority in Congress. As the opinion gets further away, Congress is more and more likely to attempt to overturn the judicial decision and accordingly, the Court should be more likely to use constitutional decision grounds. Although I disagree above with the manner in which Epstein et al. (2002) model what they call agenda setting, they do include an important concept for use as a control variable. They contend that higher levels of Court homogeneity solidify Court decisions because the more unified the Court appears to the external world, the more supportive public opinion becomes of the Court. Greater homogeneity works as another way that the Court can insulate its opinions from being overturned by Congress. As they note, several past studies have found that Congress is less likely to try to overturn a Court decision when the opinion reaches unanimity (Canon & Johnson, 1989; Eskridge, 1991) . Because I model individual cases rather than yearly percentages, I rely on a case specific measure of homogeneity, the size of the majority coalition in each case, as an indicator of the relative strength of the majority opinion. The size of the coalition represents a visible cue to the outside world about how united the Court is in a given case. Larger majorities indicate that most or all justices agree that the decision is correct. Small majorities or minimum winning coalitions indicate disagreement on the Court over the case outcome and explanation of the law. Large majority coalitions may be a second way for the Court to avoid congressional override whereas smaller coalitions may invite such action. Conceptually then, larger majority coalitions would reduce the need for selections of constitutional instruments whereas smaller coalitions would increase the need. Although majorities can be less than 5 because justices sometimes recuse themselves from cases, most majorities vary from 5 to 9. Relying on the Supreme Court Justice Data Base, I obtained the vote coalitions from the cases to construct this variable labeled size of the majority. Larger majorities should make it politically more difficult for Congress to try to overturn a decision it did not like.
Theoretically, this variable may be conditional on the amount of congressional constraint. That is, the size of the majority might only mitigate the need for strategic selection of decision grounds when constraint is actually present. In the absence of constraint, there is little reason to believe that the Court would select constitutional legal grounds as the majority coalition increases because there is no concern for congressional override. Thus, an interaction between the congressional constraint and size of the majority variables is also included.
Based on this specification I expect the following relationships. I anticipate the effect of congressional constraint to be positively related to legal instrument. As the amount of likely congressional constraint increases, the Court should be more likely to include constitutional decision grounds. The control variable, the size of the majority, should be negatively related to the legal instrument. As the majority coalition in the case gets larger, this insulates the opinion and lessens the need for constitutional legal instruments.
Results and Interpretation
Because the Court's choice of legal instruments takes on one of two possible values, I estimated the results using probit analysis. The estimated coefficients indicate how the two variables of interest and their interaction affect the probability of observing a constitutional decision rather than a statutory decision. I estimated two models, one with the interaction term and one without, and the results from the estimation are reported in Table 2 . The first column contains estimates for a model without the interaction term; the second column includes values for the interacted model.
Focusing on the primary variable of interest, congressional constraint, the estimates from both statistical models support the major argument of this article. Both estimates are correctly signed and statistically significant at the p < .05 and p < .01 levels, respectively. They demonstrate that anticipation of adverse congressional reactions based on assessments of differences in the preferences of the Court and Congress causes increases the probability that the majority opinion will employ constitutional legal instruments. These results strongly confirm the expectations of the theoretical model presented above. The size of the majority coefficient is also statistically significant and correctly signed in both models at the same significance levels, respectively, as the congressional constraint variable. These results suggest that as the majority size increases, the use of constitutional legal instruments decreases. The interaction term fails to achieve statistical significance in the interaction model. This suggests that the two variables of interest operate independently of one another and do not have a conditional effect on the dependent variable. Taken as a whole, these results strongly support the theoretical arguments provided above. The Court appears to strategically select more insular decision grounds when it anticipates negative congressional responses to its decisions.
To gauge the impact of these effects, I calculated probabilities based on the estimates from the noninteraction model using Clarify 2.0 (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 2003) . These probabilities, reported in Table 3 , indicate the likelihood of observing a constitutional decision holding the other independent variable constant. The first column presents the probabilities and the second column presents the 95% confidence intervals. In the top part of Table 3 , I compare how varying the congressional constraint measure from its minimum to its mean to its maximum affects the probability of observing Constitutional grounds. Although the increases are small, we do see a 10% increase in the probability of observing Constitutional decision grounds when the variable moves from no constraint to its maximum. The bottom part of the table indicates how additional justices in the majority coalition affect the probability of observation Constitutional decision grounds. Although the effect is also small, overall the probability increases about 5% when moving the minimum to maximum value.
Although these effects seem small, two points should be considered along with them. First, as discussed above and indicated in Table 1 , 87% of the observations of the dependent variable are 0s, meaning that in cases involving federal statutes, the overall tendency is to select statutory interpretation. This gives empirical support to norms of judicial restraint advocated by Justice Brandeis in the Ashwander rules. But at the same time there still is statistical support for the SIT argument. Tiller and Cross (2006) may be correct that there are few instances in which the Court makes this choice, however, I find support that in those instances, there is evidence of strategic behavior.
Second, the range of values that the constraint variable takes on is small as well. More than 67% of the observations of the congressional constraint 636 American Politics Research 
Conclusions
This article confirms a key criticism of strategic accounts of Supreme Court voting behavior originally made by the proponents of the AM. It demonstrates that the Court changes its mode of interpretation to constitutional review when the Court fears that Congress may respond adversely to a Court decision. In addition, it suggests need for reconsideration of strategic models of Supreme Court behavior given the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress may be more complex than once thought.
The statistical results demonstrate that the choice of decision grounds is a strategic choice, predicated on two important considerations. First, the majority opinion is more likely to include high-cost decision grounds when the Court faces congressional constraint to make it more difficult for Congress to override the decision. Second, the use of constitutional decisions grounds King / Legal Instruments and the U.S. Supreme Court 637 is reduced by the magnitude of the majority coalition. The majority coalition size acts as another buffer from congressional override and lessens the need for high-cost decision grounds in the presence of congressional constraint. Third, these results call into question whether the judicial norm cited by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander truly acts as a restraint on judicial behavior. The findings here suggest that the Court strategically selects decision grounds, meaning that at times constitutional interpretation is used in majority opinions as a political tool rather than avoided as a legal restraint. These results are also important for theoretical reasons. They provide evidence of strategic behavior by the United States Supreme Court in a nonvoting context. These results should encourage other scholars to focus on other types of nonvoting decision making to uncover the true strategic nature of the Court. They also provide an important examination of the relationship between these two important institutions. Here we have evidence that the Court strategically anticipates the actions of Congress, but in ways not previously considered. As we continue to study the interdependent way in which public policy is formed in the United States, scholars should more carefully consider whether legal phenomena are truly exogenously determined. Moreover, the results suggest that the Court has found one way to avoid congressional reactions. This provides more support to the idea that judges are not solely legal actors but also are political actors and begs the question if other seemingly legal choices that the Court makes might actually mask strategic behavior.
hierarchical relationship with Congress because they believe that any actions that Congress makes in response to a Court decision could then be reviewed by the Court in a subsequent case. As explained in the existing literature, SIT is squarely premised on a hierarchical relationship with some reviewing legal principal. This difference, however, seems largely irrelevant to a consideration of legal instrument choice on the Supreme Court given Segal and Spaeth's discussion and because SIT is cited in this study as a complimentary perspective to theirs rather than the central causal logic for my model.
9. Specifically, Smith and Tiller (2002) argue that judges will strategically select between statutory interpretation and reasoning processes (factual determinations). They argue that agency decisions based on statutory interpretation have a greater risk of being overturned by reviewing courts than reasoning process arguments because of the amount of effort and attention it would take to review reasoning process arguments.
10. Lamb's quote is actually shorter than what I cite here (298 U.S. 288, 347, 1936) . 11. More complete descriptions of the coding schemes for the legal instrument and size of majority variables are contained in the appendix.
12. Data were not collected beyond the 2000 term because the preference measure for the Court, discussed below, does not exist beyond the 2000 term.
13. Using Variable 28, DEC_TYPE = 1, 2, 6, and 7.
14. Using a model of the percentage of constitutional decisions the Court reaches each year from 1946 to 1992, the authors find that although congressional constraint reduces the number of statutory decisions, an interaction between this same constraint and Court homogeneity, the variable they use to conceptualize the level of consensus in the aggregate, also reduces the number of statutory cases.
15. Separate analyses were conducted using a three-category coding scheme and multinomial probit. The results were virtually identical. For the sake of parsimony, the use of constitutional legal grounds was collapsed into one category.
16. If Pareto sets like these truly existed, Congress would be internally forever gridlocked, never able to pass any legislation, to say nothing of its ability to constrain the Court.
17. For an explanation of the history and changes in the filibuster rule, see http:// www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm.
18. Segal (1997) encountered a similar issue because the congressional pivots were fixed within a given year. He found only a small number of years when the Court was actually outside of the Pareto sets and thus had very few observations of the key independent variable that took on values greater than 0.
